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Hobbes's views on free will and action were radically revisionary of a well-
established scholastic theory of the ethical significance of freedom and of 
freedom's relation to law. At the heart of this scholastic theory was an 
account of freedom as a multi-way power to determine alternatives, and of 
human action as a distinctively practical mode of exercising reason. The 
chapter explains this theory as developed by Suarez and, following Suarez, 
by Bramhall, and examines Hobbes's attack on the theory's basis - the theory 
of freedom as a metaphysical power, and of action as a distinctively practical 




























1.  Introduction 
 
Hobbes’s most developed account of action and its liberty is expounded in 
his controversy with John Bramhall, the exiled Anglican bishop of Derry. 
But Bramhall is the representative, as Hobbes points out, of early modern 
scholasticism, and particularly scholasticism of the Jesuit tradition. Hobbes 
drily reported that he had found nothing in Bramhall on free will and on free 
will's relation to God's concurrence that could not have been read earlier in 
Suarez’ Opuscula: 
 
It is no great bragging, to say I was not supprised; for whosoever 
chanceth to read Suarez his Opuscula where he writeth of Free-will, 
and of the concourse of God with Mans Will; shall find the greatest 
part, if not all that the Bishop hath urged in this Question.1  
 
Suarez's thought involves a highly developed account of freedom and its 
ethical significance - what we might term an 'ethics of freedom' - that was 
firmly based on the theological and canonical tradition of the Latin Church. 
This tradition taught the reality of freedom as a distinctive metaphysical 
power, and developed from a theory of freedom so conceived an account 
both of the right to liberty and of freedom as a desirable state of liberation. 
These three kinds of freedom, the power, the right and the desirable state, 
were seen as harmoniously related to law, which was taken to be directive of 
freedom as well as constitutive of it. Within this scholastic tradition the 
metaphysical power of freedom took on a dual ethical significance, as the 
basis equally of right and of obligation: metaphysical freedom variously 
provided both a normative block to legal coercion of the individual, and the 
normative basis of that very coercion. Underlying this complex theory of 
freedom and its relation to law and, indeed, essential to the theory, was a 
practical reason-based model of action. Human action was conceived as 
reason taking practical or action-constitutive form: a mode of reason 
involving special, intellectual or reason-involving motivations of the will - 
motivations that constituted a distinctively goal-directed mode of 
intentionality or of psychological direction at an object of thought. It was as 
practical reason-based that action could be governed and directed by natural 
                                                 
1 Hobbes in The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance, 28 
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law, conceived as a demanding form taken by practical reason that was 
specifically directive of the metaphysical power of freedom. 
 
Hobbes denied the existence of distinctively intellectual and action-
constitutive motivations of the will. Action was henceforth to come to no 
more than voluntariness - an effect of non-intellectual passions. Hobbes also 
denied the very existence of freedom as a metaphysical power. The theory of 
a right to liberty could no longer be based on any appeal to freedom as a 
metaphysical power, and nor could natural law be conceived any longer as 
practical reason in distinctively freedom-directive form. Though the account 
of liberty and law that resulted was not fully worked out, its outline was 
clear. Liberty and law would henceforth be opposed phenomena, no longer 
existing in harmony. And metaphysical freedom could no longer do the work 
it once did in scholastic jurisprudence to limit legal coercion. Where once 
the coercion of religious belief was blocked, when it was, by the 
metaphysical freedom - the free will or liberum arbitrium  - of the believer, 
now a new foundation of the right to liberty of religious belief had to be 
found: in the supposed privacy and non-voluntariness of belief. 
 
 
2. The ethics of freedom 
 
 - freedom as a power 
 
Blame, it seems, is no ordinary criticism. To blame someone for what they 
do is not just to point out a fault in them. We can do that without blaming 
them for the fault.  Blame adds something more; the thought that not only is 
there a fault, but that the fault’s existence is their fault, the responsibility of 
the person blamed. Blame involves the idea of a special or moral 
responsibility. In blame we are putting the faulty action down to the person 
blamed. And if the fault can be put down to them as their fault, that implies 
that they must have had the power to determine its occurrence for 
themselves.  
 
Aquinas gave a characterization of moral blame along just these lines. To 
blame someone is to criticize them rationally - by reference to a standard of 
reason that they have failed to meet. But to blame someone is not simply to 
criticize them as foolish or less than sensible. First, moral blame condemns 
some action or omission not as foolish, but as bad. The criticism then goes 
further, and imputes the fault in their action (or omission) to the agent as 
their fault, and as their fault because they were in control - they had 
dominium over the act. 
 
Hence a human action is worthy of praise or blame in so far as it is 
good or bad.  For praise and blame is nothing other than for the 
goodness or badness of his action to be imputed to someone.  Now 
an action is imputed to an agent when it is within his power, so that 
he has dominion (dominium) over the act.  But this is the case with 
all actions involving the will: for it is through the will that man has 
dominion over his action...Hence it follows that good or bad in 
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actions of the will alone justifies praise and blame; for in such 
actions badness, fault and blame come to one and the same.2  
 
This power to determine things for ourselves is naturally conceived by us as 
freedom.  Freedom is a multi-way kind of power – a power to do A or to 
refrain: a power of control that leaves it up to us - within our control - which 
of these alternatives we do. And this power of control over what we do is 
one that we definitely do think of ourselves as possessing. Within certain 
limits provided by our intelligence, knowledge and physical capacity, it is, 
we suppose, up to us – within our power – to determine how we act.  It is up 
to us what we do, so that we are free to act otherwise. This multi-way power 
extends to our agency as a whole – and to our decisions to act as well as to 
the acts decided upon. Indeed there seems to be a dependence of our 
freedom in general on a freedom specifically of decision-making. It is up to 
me what I do only because I can decide for myself what I shall do and it is 
up to me how I decide. So we naturally believe in freedom as a power that 
must be exerciseable at the point of decision or choice. This decision-making 
capacity was traditionally called the will, and so freedom as a natural or 
metaphysical power to determine for ourselves how we act has traditionally 
been referred to as freedom of will or free will. 
 
Peter Lombard's discussion of freedom, central to the treatment of this 
subject in the subsequent school tradition, introduces freedom precisely as a 
multi-way power, that is, a power that by its nature leaves it up to us which 
actions we perform, one and the same power being exercisable to determine 
one action or another. Lombard also locates this power in the will, so that it 
is indeed up to us how we choose or decide. Lombard referred to  
 
free will [liberum arbitrium], which the philosophers have defined as the 
free judgement of the will [liberum de voluntate iudicium], because the 
very power and ability of the will and reason, which we said above was 
free will, is free regarding whichever alternative it pleases because it can 
be moved freely to this or to that.3  
 
How should we understand freedom as a multi-way power? In the 
Metaphysical Disputations Suarez developed an account of two types of 
efficient cause. An ordinary efficient cause is a necessary cause, with but 
one effect that it will, of necessity, produce: as a brick hurled at a window 
must break it. But a rational creature, a human or an angel, may be a 
contingent or free cause. A free cause operates contingently, in that it is 
antecedently undetermined whether or not it will produce a given effect. 
Which of a range of effects will be produced is contingent and up to the free 
cause to determine. And our possession as free agents of this contingent and 
distinctively multi-way causal power is represented and revealed to us in 
experience: "Second we can argue from experience. For it is evident to us 
                                                 
2 Aquinas 1950, 1a2ae q21 a 2, resp p. 112  
 
3 Lombard 1981, 461 
 
 5 
from experience that it is within our power to do a given thing or to refrain 
from doing it."4 Bramhall shares  this Suarezian conception of freedom as a 
multi-way causal power: "A free Agent is that, which when all things are 
present, that are needful to produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce 
it." 5   
 
 
 - freedom as a desirable condition 
 
Besides freedom as free will, there is another kind of freedom. This is 
freedom not as a power or capacity to determine, but rather as a desirable 
state or condition that one might seek to attain. This is the idea of freedom as 
a state of liberation - an ethically desirable state opposed to servitude or 
enslavement. Freedom or libertas was deployed within the school tradition as 
the term not just for the multi-way power, but for the desirable ethical 
condition. The medieval theory of freedom was part of a general account of 
creation, fall and redemption—a process of corruption and recovery both 
ethical and metaphysical in which freedom took correspondingly reduced and 
recovered forms.  
 
Adam’s fall was a fall from an original state of created innocence into a state 
of ethical degradation - a state that was described as one of servitude. And 
Christ’s redemption was described as a release from the same servitude, 
bringing ultimate ethical perfection in heaven, a state that was described as 
one of perfect liberty or freedom, a supernatural condition transcending our 
original created condition and approaching, as far as the retention of our 
created human nature could permit, the condition of God.  
 
Peter Lombard gave a highly important kind of theory of freedom as 
liberation - a theory which built the theory of the ethical condition on a 
theory of the metaphysical power.6 For Lombard, as for other thinkers in his 
tradition, the power of freedom has a proper function. The function of the 
power of freedom is to take us, through decisions that are right and 
meritorious or deserving of reward, to the beatitude of heaven. And 
liberation is the perfection of the power, by the removal of the capacity to 
use it badly, and the removal of conditions, such as wayward passions, 
understood as obstructive of or inappropriate to that power as properly used.  
 
As we were originally created, the metaphysical power of freedom was a 
libertas minor - a power both to do good and also to do bad. While the final 
liberation of heaven will involve our enjoyment of the libertas maior 
enjoyed eternally by God - the perfection of our power of freedom through 
                                                 
4 In metaphysicam Aristotelis, in Suarez 1856-70, volume 25, 697 
 
5 Bramhall in Questions, 298 
 
6 For his classic discussion, Lombard 1981, 461–9. 
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the complete removal of any power to do bad or to sin. The power that is 
thus perfected is seen not only as perfected but also as increased:  
 
Indeed a choice [arbitrium] that is quite unable to sin will be the 
freer...after the confirmation of beatitude there is to be a free will in 
man by which he will not be able to sin; and this free will is now in 
the Angels and in the Saints, who are with the Lord; and certainly it 
is the more free, as it is the more immune from sin and the more 
prone to good. For one is the further from that servitude of sin, of 
which it is written: He who works sin is the slave of sin, as one’s 
judgment is freer in choosing the good.7  
 
The perfection of the power in the libertas maior of heaven will involve the 
power's perfect conformity with reason. Freedom is a power that 
presupposes our capacity for reason, which is why the power is lacking in 
the lower, non-rational animals. And the power's perfection will involve the 
loss of any capacity to use the power in opposition to reason. 
 
 
 - freedom as a right 
 
There is a third use for freedom or libertas. If someone tells you what to do, 
and even threatens you with some sanction if you do not follow their 
direction, then, if you think they lack the authority so to direct you, you may 
very well protest: 'Don't tell me what to do; it's up to me what I do!'  And 
here we find talk of freedom or of what is up to us being used not to assert a 
power, or a desirable ethical condition, but a right. Here we find another kind 
of thing called freedom: not a capacity to determine for ourselves what we 
do, but a right to determine for ourselves what we do. This is the idea of 
freedom as a right to liberty that might comprise various more specific rights. 
One central such right is the right not to be coerced; that is, the right not to be 
directed to do something through the threat of penalties if we do not act as 
directed.  
 
The use of terms such as up to me to assert both the power and the right is 
highly significant. It suggests some intimate connexion between the two 
phenomena. And there is one immediately obvious, indeed almost 
irresistible, way of understanding the connexion between the power and the 
right: namely that the right is, fundamentally, a right to exercise the power. 
Freedom as a right is a right to determine things for oneself; and that is just 
the right to exercise one's power of freedom - one's capacity to determine 
things for oneself. How could there be a right to determine things for oneself 
without the capacity to determine things for oneself?  And what else could 
the right be than the right to exercise the capacity?   
 
This is how Suarez, in particular, understood the right to liberty - as a 
recognition at the normative level of this power, namely in the form of a right 
to exercise it. Freedom as a right is, as I suggested earlier, the right to the 
                                                 
7 Lombard 1981, 463 
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exercise of freedom as a power. Notice the following passage from Suarez, in 
which nature equips man both with libertas in the form of a power to 
determine his actions, and with the right to exercise that power. The right to 
liberty is a dominium libertatis or right over his own metaphysical freedom. 
 
If, however, we are speaking of the natural law of dominion, it is then true 
that liberty is a matter of natural law, in a positive, not merely a negative 
sense, since nature itself confers upon man the true dominion of his liberty 
(dominium libertatis). 
 
For liberty rather than slavery is a precept of the natural law, for this reason, 
namely, that nature has made men free in a positive sense (so to speak) with 
an intrinsic right to liberty, whereas it has not made them slaves in this 
positive sense, strictly speaking.8  
 
The term dominium could be used in scholastic discussions with exactly the 
same shifting reference as attaches to our up to us: either to refer to freedom 
as a power; or to refer to the right to exercise that power.  
 
In basing a right to liberty on metaphysical freedom, Suarez was faithful to a 
longstanding feature of the canonical tradition of the Latin Church - a 
canonical tradition of which Suarez was himself a notable and perceptive 
interpreter. One frequently cited text in early modern Catholic theological 
discussion is the decree of the fourth provincial council of Toledo of 633, 
which forbad the use of coercion - legal directives backed up by threats of 
punishment - to impose the faith on Jews.9 This ban on coercion was not 
based on the theory that we might find in the post-Hobbesian English-
language tradition - that belief is an internally private and non-voluntary act 
that it is just impossible for humans to coerce. Rather because the act of faith 
is an act of free will - liberum arbitrium - the Church, or the Christian state, 
lacks the authority to coerce it in Jews. Given free will, any licit coercion 
would require some adequate juridical grounding - a juridical subjection of 
the believer to the coercing authority; and in the case of faith that juridical 
subjection could only occur through baptism, which Jews lack. Once 
someone is baptized, on the other hand, their free will gives them no 
protection against coercion. Rather their free will allows them to be held 
responsible for their failure to meet an obligation of fidelity which baptism 
has imposed on them; and so as responsible, they can fairly be threatened 
with punishment for breach of that obligation.  
 
Metaphysical freedom protects people against coercion. Given free will, 
coercion is forbidden without special justification, such as justification in the 
form of obligations of obedience or fidelity incurred to some legitimate 
coercive authority. But once those obligations have been incurred, the power 
of freedom then enables people to be bound by those obligations and to be 
                                                 
8 De legibus in Suarez 1856-70, volume 5, 141 
 
9 Friedberg 1881, volume 1, 161-2 
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held responsible for meeting them. Metaphysical freedom is thus both a 
normative barrier to legal coercion and an enabler of it, as a foundation both 
of liberty and of obligation. In both ways metaphysical freedom is intimately 
linked to scholastic conceptions of law. 
 
 
2. Freedom, law and action 
 
 - law and freedom 
 
The primary form of law for Suarez, as for the rest of his tradition, is not the 
positive law contingently legislated for this or that community, but natural 
law - a law of reason itself that applies to beings capable not only of reason 
but of freedom as a metaphysical power. Natural law is a distinctive form of 
normativity that governs all possessors of human nature - a kind of rational 
standard that constitutes, at the ethical level, the recognition, not just of 
human rationality, but of human freedom as well. The scholastic theory of 
freedom in its various forms is intimately linked, then, to a theory of law. 
Freedom and law are treated as existing in a complex harmony. Freedom is 
something that law recognizes and directs; but freedom is something that 
law also supplies and even something that law directly constitutes - with the 
freedom so variously related to law taking more than one form. 
 
At the most fundamental level, law presupposes and gives recognition to 
freedom as a metaphysical power, and in two ways. Law provides us with 
rights, including a right to freedom: freedom as a right is, as we have 
discussed, a right to exercise the power. But freedom also gives direction in 
the form of obligation. Legal direction, through the imposition of 
obligations, is needed at all only because freedom exists as a power over 
alternatives, a power that may be misused in the direction of the bad. Law 
serves to direct us towards the good, and away from the bad, by constituting 
the bad as wrong or a breach of obligation. And in directing us to the good 
freedom also directs us towards a state of liberation, in which the power of 
freedom will be perfected. 
 
Fundamental to the late scholastic understanding of the relation between 
freedom and obligation is blame: moral obligation or obligation under 
natural law is understood as that standard we can be fairly blamed for 
breaching. Blame itself is not seen as a mode of punishment or sanction, but 
rather as a distinctive form of rational criticism. The criticism is generally 
understood just as Aquinas conceived it to be - a criticism for disregarding 
reason in a form that governs and addresses not simply some exercise on our 
part of our capacity for reason, but the exercise by us of a power of freedom. 
 
Practical reason is seen within scholastic ethical theory as containing a 
variety of kinds of justificatory force. On the one hand, reason may merely 
recommend through consilia or counsels. Here reason carries the force of 
mere advice, and does not take the force of law. The natural law, by contrast, 
is reason in preceptive form, a form in which reason does not merely 
recommend through advisory counsels or consilia but demands through 
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obligatory precepts or praecepta. In other words, the natural law is a 
demandingly directive form of reason: reason that with the binding force of 
obligation serves to direct the proper use of freedom. And this obligatory 
directive force is communicated by blame - that freedom-presupposing 
criticism that imputes the badness in our agency to us as our fault, and our 
fault because of our dominium or freedom to determine for ourselves which 
action we perform.   
 
Now any directive force of reason must directly address and apply to the 
will. For it is at the point of the will - the point at which we choose or decide 
to perform this action rather than that - that we immediately respond to 
directives of practical reason. Consider what Hobbes would term a voluntary 
action - that is, an action we might perform on the basis of a prior decision 
or will to perform it.  Take a voluntary action such as going to the bank, for 
example: suppose that going to the bank is advisable because, say, it is a 
means to getting money. Then if this voluntary action is supported by 
practical reason with the force of advice or recommendation, so too, in 
general, will the decision to perform it - the decision to go to the bank. That 
decision too is advisable, and can be taken by us just as an advisable 
decision, motivating us then to go to the bank. The force of recommendation 
applies not only to voluntary actions, but also to decisions to perform those 
voluntary actions; and that is how the force of recommendation moves us to 
act as recommended.  
 
As for advisability as a recommendatory justificatory force or mode of 
justificatory support, so too on this force model of obligation, for moral 
obligatoriness as a parallel but demanding justificatory force or mode of 
justificatory support.10 Obligations of the natural law are immediately 
obligations on the will. As Aquinas made clear, under natural law we were 
bound to will obligatory external actions, and bound not to will prohibited 
ones, so that the existence of an obligation to give alms implied a 
corresponding obligation to decide and intend to give alms.11 And Suarez 
repeated this doctrine. The law of nature speaks to us, he says, as the voice 
of our reason; and so it must apply to and direct the will itself:  
 
So teaches Saint Thomas and on this point everyone. And the point is 
established because the law of nature is placed in reason, and 
immediately directs and governs the will. So it is on the will first and 
foremost that as it were by its very nature the obligation of the law is 
                                                 
10 For further discussion of the Force model of obligation and its history, 
see Pink 2004, 2005, and 2009.  
 
11 See Aquinas 1950,  1a2ae, q.100, a.9, 463 
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imposed. So the law is not kept unless through the exercise of the 
will.12  
 
Behind this lies a conception of obligation, not simply as a kind of 
command, though obligations might be imposed through commands, but as a 
demanding mode of justificatory support -  a preceptive vis directiva or 
justificatory force.  
 
 
elicited act of                  imperated act/      
motivation/will      voluntary action 
 
Decision/ Intention to do A     Doing A 
 
    
 
  Justify with given force  Features F, G... of  
 (such as obligatoriness)        doing A  
 
 
Since freedom is exercised in and through the capacity for intentional or 
deliberate action, this means that both blame and the justificatory force of 
obligation linked to blame are tied to applying to action. Now if the force of 
moral obligation is a justificatory force that is freedom- and agency-specific, 
this has implications for the capacity for decision or will - the decision-
making capacity which any justificatory force within practical reason must 
address. The capacity for will or decision must itself and in particular be a 
capacity for free action. The scholastic force of moral obligation, and with it 
natural law, must address and direct a free will.  
 
 
 - the practical reason-based model of action 
 
The force model of moral obligation is intimately linked, therefore, to a 
distinctive model of action that located free action, as required, in the will.  
This model, general within the school tradition, is practical reason-based. 
For the will can be a locus of free action, as a free will, if the very nature of 
action is explained as consisting in that mode of exercising reason by which 
we respond, as agents, to any force of practical reason - as we do at the point 
of the will when we decide on one voluntary action or another.  
 
Intentional action occurs as the deliberately purposive; it involves goal- 
directedness - intentionally doing something as means to an end, even if in 
some cases the end at which the action is directed is its own performance 
and the action is performed only for its own sake. So a central feature of any 
theory of action will be its account of purposiveness - of the use of means to 
attain ends.  
                                                 
12 De legibus in Suarez 1856-70,  volume 5, 123 
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The scholastic tradition understood purposiveness, and with it intentional 
action, to consist in a distinctively practice- or agency-constitutive mode of 
exercising reason. Intentionally to pursue an end is to direct oneself, through 
the exercise of one's capacity for reason, at an object of thought in a goal-
directed and so action-constitutive way. In intentional action one directs 
oneself at an object of thought, not as something true, nor as something 
merely good or desirable, but as a goal - something desirable and to be 
attained through one's exercise of reason. And one exercised reason in this 
goal-directed way in acts of electio: in decisions or intention-formations, 
where what one decided on - the object of the decision - was a goal to be 
attained through that very decision. 
 
We can look at medieval action theory as locating action as one distinctive 
form of intentionality or of psychological object-direction. For action shares 
an important characteristic with psychological attitudes such as ordinary 
beliefs, desires and emotions - even psychological states which are not, in 
general, formed by action as the agent's own deliberate or intentional doing. 
Each of actions and attitudes are directed at an object of thought - an object 
that makes the action or attitude immediately intelligible as something 
susceptible of interpretation. The object of a belief or desire or fear tells us 
what is believed or desired or feared; that is, it gives us the content of the 
attitude. The object of an action tells us for what purpose the action was 
performed, or at what goal its performance was directed: 'her object in 
waving like that was to alert her friends'.  
 
We may think of the object of an action or attitude as serving to explain that 
action or attitude by rendering it to some degree intelligible. This 
explanatory function was identified within the Aristotelian tradition as 
involving formal causation: the object informs the action or attitude as 
explanatory form to matter, and makes what it informs the specific action, 
belief, desire or fear that it is. Formal causation is not of course causation in 
the modern sense - what Aristotle called causation in efficient form. For the 
object of thought need not be actual; it need not be realised or instanced in 
the world as genuine causes in efficient form must be. The object provides 
intelligibility; but it need not do so as a feature of the world that actually 
produced the action or attitude made intelligible. 
 
The theory of action was thus developed within a wider account of 
psychological attitudes and their object-direction. Indeed the primary case of 
action was taken to occur in psychological attitudes of the will, as choices or 
decisions, and in the formation of the distinctively goal-directed attitude of 
intention.   
 
Just as the formation of beliefs is an exercise of theoretical reason directed at 
objects as truths to be cognized, so intentional actions were supposed to be 
exercises of practical reason directed at objects as goals, goods to be attained 
through the action. The locus of such a practical attitude of goal-direction 
was taken to be the will as a faculty of decision and intention - of motivating 
attitudes that were distinctively rational or reason-applying. As Scotus put it: 
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Also note that praxis or practice is an act of some power or faculty 
other than intellect, that naturally follows an act of knowledge or 
intellection, and is suited by nature to be elicited in accord with 
correct knowledge if it is to be right.13  
 
And this capacity is found in the will – a psychological capacity the function 
of which is precisely to determine action in accordance with deliberation and 
belief about how to act. The will is the rational appetite – the locus of 
motivations whose function is to be responsive to and executory of 
deliberations about how to act: 
 
From all this it follows that nothing is formally praxis except an 
imperated or elicited act of will, because no act other than that of will 
is elicited in agreement with a prior act of the intellect.14  
 
So the application of practical, action-governing reason is itself practice.  
We have a theory of action that is practical reason-based.  Intentional action 
occurs as a distinctively practical or practice-constitutive mode of exercising 
reason.  The freedom that we exercise in and through action is, therefore, a 
power exercised over and dependent on the exercise of a capacity for reason: 
"Reason is the root, the fountain, the original of true liberty, which judgeth 
and representeth to the will, whether this or that be convenient, whether this 
or that be more convenient."15   
 
In so far as the primary locus of agency is in the will, so freedom is 
primarily a power of the will – exercised in and through election or choice 
and decision: "True Liberty consists in the elective power of the rational 
Will."16  and "Certainly all the freedome of the Agent, is from the freedom 
of the will.  If the will have no power over it self, the Agent is no more free 
than a Staff in a mans hand."17   
 
The intellectual nature – the capacity for reason – that humans possess 
involves a radical psychological distinction between humans and the lower 
animals, which lack any capacity for reason. This distinction shows up both 
in the constitution of the mind and in the nature of agency itself.  
 
                                                 
13 Wolter 1986, 127 
 
14 Wolter 1986, 129 
 
15 Bramhall in Questions, 30 
 
16 Bramhall in Questions, 30 
 
17 Bramhall in Questions, 32 
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As reason is above matter and material embodiment, the human capacity to 
respond to reason, both theoretically in belief and practically, at the point of 
the will, in action, is exercised independently of any bodily organ. The 
faculties of intellect and will are immaterial and survive bodily death. So 
humans possess immaterial capacities or faculties wholly absent from 
wholly material animal minds. And since the intentional actions that we 
perform occur as a mode of exercising reason, no such actions are performed 
by animals. Animal action is only an analogue of fully deliberate or 
intentional human action, not another case of exactly the same kind.  
 
Human action in fact divides into two elements. There is the primary 
instance of action, where the practical reason-based model directly applies. 
These are actus eliciti or internal acts of the will itself – acts of choice or 
decision involving the exercise of reason in action-constitutive form. Then 
there are the actions decided upon that involve capacities outside the will 
itself, including capacities located in bodily organs such as limb motion. 
These are actus imperati or external acts – external to the will itself. These 
latter actions are actions only derivatively, through being motivated objects 
and effects of the primary cases of action, the elicited actions of the will 
itself. So the status of imperated actions as actions lies in their being cases of 
doing something on the basis of a will to do it.   
 
Voluntariness in the way of an imperated act, is nothing else than a 
certain character or denomination of the imperated act received from 
an elicited act, of which the imperated act is object and effect.  For an 
imperated act is termed voluntary simply because it proceeds from an 
elicited act of the will, and is in a measure informed by it, and with it 
constitutes one morally significant act.18  
 
Bramhall faithfully adopts this scholastic model of action: 
 
This I take to be the clear resolution of the Schools; There is a double 
act of the will, the one more remote, called Imperatus, that is in truth 
the act of some inferiour faculty, subject to the command of the will, 
as to open or shut ones eyes; without doubt these actions may be 
compelled.  The other act is neerer, called actus elicitus, an act drawn 
out of the will; as to will, to choose, to elect; this may be stopped or 
hindered by the intervening impediment of the understanding, as a 
stone lying on a table is kept from its natural motion, otherwise the 
will should have a kind of Omnipotence; But the will cannot be 
compelled to an act repugnant to its inclination, as when a stone is 
thrown upwards into the air, for that is both to incline, and not to 
incline to the same object, at the same time, which implies a 
contradiction.19   
 
                                                 
18 De voluntario in Suarez 1856-70, volume 4, 160 
 
19 Bramhall in Questions, 215-16 
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It might appear that there is very little left in common between imperated 
actions and the elicited actions of the will that give rise to them. On the one 
case we have a distinctively practical mode of response to an object of 
thought - an action-constitutive mode of exercising reason that takes 
immaterial form. On the other hand we have what is just an efficiently 
caused effect of the will to perform it – something that, considered in itself, 
might be the mere motion of a bodily organ. The former is an action because 
of its mode of direction towards an object internal to it. The latter is 
contentless and objectless in its own right, and is an action simply as an 
effect of something else. This allowed Hobbes to accuse the scholastics of 
equivocation in their theory of action. 
 
Animal action, by contrast, involves no immaterial acts of will, but simply 
the motivation of external actions by passions. Passions, which we and the 
animals share, are motivational or appetitive states that are themselves non-
intellectual and – unlike the motivations of the will – are corporeally based. 
Motivations of the will are responsive to the good in a form that is grasped 
intellectually. By contrast the passions are responsive only to sensorily 
presented goods. While the passions are the only motivations that determine 
animal action, any influence the passions have on human action (solely 
through influencing how the will’s object appears) is mediated by and 
subject to the decision of the will – the free exercise of which constitutes the 
primary form of every deliberate human action. Indeed it is possible, at least 
in principle, for human action to occur unmotivated by any passion; though 
in practice the influence of passions is considerable. For Suarez, the passions 
cannot act as efficient causes directly on the will, still less determine it20, and 
they will not usually remove freedom. But the passions can make the 
exercise of freedom in opposition to them very difficult. Disordered passions 
will therefore require careful discipline through habituation. More than that, 
with supernatural help, through grace, we may conform to a supernatural 
law, and attain liberation from the weakness of disordered passion, and a 
perfection of our power of freedom beyond anything of which we are 
naturally capable. 
 
Just as with divine help we can be raised beyond our human nature, so we 
can on occasion be degraded below it, to the level of non-rational creation. It 
is possible, in cases of madness or extreme emotion even for human passions 
to motivate action directly, bypassing the will. Then we are reduced to the 
level of beasts or animals. Our reason is disengaged from our action – and 
with it freedom or control of what we are doing is lacking too. 
 
 
 - summary 
 
The scholastic ethics of freedom that we find in highly developed form in 
Suarez's ethics thus involves a complex and distinctive theory of 
normativity, linked to an equally distinctive moral psychology and theory of 
action - all built upon the human possession of freedom as a multi-way 
                                                 
20 De voluntario in Suarez 1856-70, volume 4, 248 
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power over alternatives. The power of freedom is given normative 
recognition through a distinctive form of normativity within practical reason, 
which is the normativity of law. And law recognizes the power of freedom 
both by imposing obligations on us and by affording us rights. First, law 
provides a mode of rational direction - of justificatory force - that is 
freedom-specific, and that addresses a capacity for free action exercised, in 
practical reason-based form, at the point of the will. This is moral 
obligatoriness understood as a distinctively demanding mode of justificatory 
force, tied to the direction of free action through its constitutive linkage to 
moral blame as a freedom-specific mode of rational criticism. Secondly law 
recognizes the power of freedom by providing the right to exercise it - the 
right to liberty understood as a dominium libertatis, or right to determine 
alternatives. Thus does the normativity of law combine lex and ius, 
obligation and liberty, as dual ways of giving ethical recognition to 
metaphysical freedom. And in directing the power of freedom, law finally 
serves to liberate us, leading us to that condition in which the power which 
law directs is perfected.  
 
 
3. The impact of Hobbes 
 
Hobbes challenges every element of this theory both of human self-
determination as a multi-way power exercised at the point of the will, and of 
the normative recognition of this power in law. 
 
Blame becomes detached from any capacity for self-determination. And 
such power to determine action that is to be found in ourselves is not 
freedom but voluntariness. This is simply a causal power of our appetites to 
cause their satisfaction – a capacity to do A on the basis of a will or desire to 
do A. Freedom is no longer the two-way power we ordinarily take it to be.  
Indeed it is no longer a form of power at all, but really an absence of 
obstacles to power: liberty is now the absence of external obstacles to acting 
as one wills. And voluntariness and any associated liberty does not extend to 
our decisions to act – which are simply very powerful appetites and which 
are themselves inherently non-voluntary. There is no voluntariness of the 
will, and so there is no freedom or liberty of the will. Our every action, like 
every other event, is causally predetermined by prior occurrences. Action is 
determined to occur by necessity: a necessity with which voluntariness and, 
on Hobbes’s theory of it, liberty, are wholly consistent. Since freedom no 
longer exists as a form of power, so law can no longer exist as giving 
normative recognition to this power, either by directing its exercise through 
obligation or by giving a right to its exercise in a form of moral liberty. The 
relation between law and freedom must take quite another form. And since 
freedom no longer exists as a power, still less as a power specific to rational 
creation, so there can be no state of liberation that consists in the rational 
perfection of the power and  its detachment from irrational passions. 
 
On what basis does Hobbes mount his challenge?  He mounts his challenge 
on the basis of what he takes to be well-conceived philosophy that is critical 
of past forms of linguistic expression. We must carefully consider not just 
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the terms we inherit from past philosophy, but what ideas or conceptions 
those terms may or may not express. The enemy is school philosophy which 
uses a jargon to detach us from our own thoughts – from the conceptions we 
really think with. Hobbes maintains that sound Protestant Christianity 
supports his view. Philosophy confirms the teachings of Luther and Calvin: 
that there is no freedom of will, and that human actions are products of 
necessity; indeed they are divinely predetermined. But philosophy can 
access these truths anyway, independently of any revealed theology: 
"Questions of free will, of justification, of the way Christ is received in the 
sacrament, are philosophical."21  
 
 - human and animal 
 
Hobbes’s assault on this whole scholastic theory of self-determination 
centres on the gulf it places between human and animal psychology. To an 
important extent, Hobbes removes the distinctively reason-constitutive or 
intellectual part of scholastic psychology, to leave at least in broad outline 
the part shared with the animals. There are no longer any immaterial 
faculties of will and intellect. We are left instead with sense, imagination 
derived from sense, and with passion. The theory of human reason, of 
human action and of the capacity to determine action is then reconstructed to 
fit into this reduced psychology – a psychology which leaves human 
psychology continuous with, indeed only a more developed version of the 
psychology of the lower animals, and human action a phenomenon no 
different from animal action. And with the reason-constitutive faculties of 
intellect and will goes the distinctive power of freedom that they supported. 
There are no free causes, operating immaterially, apart from any bodily 
organ, but only necessary ones operating within a wholly material world. 
 
Hobbes’s attack on the idea of a clear psychological gulf between rational 
humans and non-rational animals involves some continuity, though mainly 
in rhetoric or expression, between him and the radical Augustinianism of 
those Protestant authors whom he was so willing to cite in his support. For 
there is an ancient tradition, going back to the Church Fathers, but deployed 
with especial emphasis in Calvin, of understanding the consequences of the 
fall - the servitude from which freedom as liberation releases us - as a kind 
of degradation, at least in relation to motivation and practice, from humanity 
to animality.22 But in Hobbes of course, it is no longer a question of a 
degradation from which we might be liberated, but of natural condition.  
And any freedom of will that Calvin supposes us to have lost, is supposed by 
Hobbes to be not lost but strictly unintelligible.  
                                                 
21 Hobbes De cive 18.14, 293 
 
22 "But man does not choose by reason and pursue with zeal what is truly 
good for himself according to the excellence of his immortal nature; nor 
does he use his reason in deliberation or bend his mind to it. Rather, like an 
animal he follows the inclination of his nature, without reason, without 
deliberation." Calvin 1960, volume 1, 286 
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Reason remains peculiarly human. Hobbes does not deny that humans have a 
distinctive capacity for reason. But it ceases to be a capacity separating the 
very constitution of our mind from that of animals. Since the psychological 
states possessed by humans are just those possessed by animals, reason 
involves something importantly extra-mental – not a further part of the mind, 
but the use of a tool which some minds, human minds, use to express what 
they contain.  Human reason comes simply to the possession of language, 
and reasoning is simply a form of thinking with and about language and the 
ideas expressed in language: 
 
 
Out of all which we may define, (that is to say determine,) what that 
is, which is meant by this word Reason, when wee reckon it amongst 
the Faculties of the mind.  For REASON, in this sense, is nothing but 
Reckoning (that is, Adding and Substracting) of the Consequences of 
generall names agreed upon, for the marking and signifying of our 
thoughts; I say marking them, when we reckon by our selves; and 
signifying, when we demonstrate, or approve our reckonings to other 
men.23   
 
 
 - action as voluntary action 
 
There are no longer distinctively reason-involving motivations. All 
motivations are passions. The will is simply the last appetite or passion in 
deliberating – the passion that finally determines how we act.  So action can 
no longer be understood in terms of some distinctive mode of exercising 
reason, but becomes identified with the only element of scholastic action 
theory that survives – the category of imperated action. Hobbes's position 
was clear: imperated acts as effects of the will, are acceptable, allowing for 
reservations about the term 'imperated': 
 
Wherein letting pass that Metaphoricall speech of attributing 
command and subjection to the faculties of the Soul, as if they made 
a Common-wealth or Family among themselves, and could speak one 
to another, which is very improper in searching the truth of the 
question; You may observe first that to compell a voluntary act, is 
nothing else, but to will it; for it is all one to say, my will commands 
the shutting of mine eyes, or the doing of any other action, and to 
say, I have the will to shut my eyes.  So that actus imperatus here, 
might as easily have been said in English, a voluntary action, but that 
they that invented the tearm, understood not any thing it signified.24  
                                                 
23 Hobbes, Leviathan 5, 18  
 




The only power that is exercised in action is a power of passive appetites or 
passions to get us to act as desired. It is a voluntariness that involves 
motivation, not through a distinctive faculty of will, but through passion. 
And passions are not themselves voluntary. We have no power over will or 
motivation, since any action-determining power in us is to be found in our 
motivations themselves. And this power is not self-determining, since 
motivations are not themselves voluntary: "I acknowledge this liberty, that I 
can do if I will, but to say, I can will if I will, I take to be an absurd 
speech."25 and "Can any man but a Schoolman think that the Wil is 
voluntary? But yet the Wil is the cause of voluntary actions."26  
 
Indeed, the very notion of self-determination is viewed by Hobbes as 
viciously regressive: "And if a man determine himself, the Question will still 
remain what determined him to determine himself in that manner."27  
 
The scholastic claim that there are elicited acts of the will itself is confused 
and even unintelligible. The claim is confused on three counts. First, it 
involve a distinction of supposedly ‘rational’ or 'intellectual' motivations 
from ‘non-rational’ or 'sensitive' motivations or passions - a distinction that 
Hobbes regards as empty and never satisfactorily explained by its scholastic 
defenders: 
 
For I do not fear it will be thought too hot for my fingers, to shew the 
vanity of such words as these, Intellectual appetite, Conformity of the 
appetite to the object, Rational will, Elective power of the Rational 
will; nor understand I how Reason can be the root of true Liberty, if 
the Bishop (as he saith in the beginning) had the liberty to write this 
discourse. I understand how objects, and the Conveniences and the 
Inconveniences of them, may be represented to a man by the help of 
his senses; but how Reason representeth anything to the Will, I [do 
not] understand ...28   
 
The idea of a freedom or agency of will is as absurd as the idea of a will or 
agency of passion, since the former idea reduces to the second: "...nor can a 
man more determine his will than any other appetite; that is, more than he 
can determine when he shall be hungry and when not."29   
                                                 
25 Hobbes in Questions, 29 
 
26 Hobbes in Questions, 256 
 
27 Hobbes in Questions, 26 
 
28 Hobbes in Questions, 35-6 
 




Second, given the unintelligibility of a practical mode of exercising 
rationality, the only consistent and intelligible model of agency is that of 
being the voluntary product of a desire to do it. But that model cannot apply 
to passions or motivations: as we have noted, for Hobbes the will itself 
cannot be voluntary.   
 
Third, since the will is the locus of a power to act, its role is to explain and 
give rise to our actions, but cannot be supposed to perform actions itself – 
any more than our power or capacity to dance can itself be supposed to go in 
for dancing itself. The very idea of actions of the will is a kind of category 
mistake: 
 
Secondly, you may observe, that actus elicitus, is exemplified by 
these words, to Will, to Elect, to Choose, which are all one, and so to 
will here is made an act of the will; and indeed, as the will is a 
faculty or power of a mans soul, so to will is an act of it, according to 
that power. But as it is absurdly said, that to dance is an act allured or 
drawn by fair means out of the ability to dance; so it is also to say, 
that to will, is an act allured or drawn out of the power to will, which 




And where he [Bramhall] sayes our Wills are in our power, he sees 
not that he speaks absurdly; for he ought to say, the Will is the 
Power.31   
 
 
 - liberty and power 
 
Freedom survives, not as a two-way power over action, but as Hobbesian 
liberty – not itself a power, but an absence of obstacles to power, such as to 
the force of passions or indeed to any force.   
 
"As if it were not Freedome enough for a man to do what he will, unless his 
Will also have power over his Will, and that his Will be not the power it 
self, but must have another power within it to do all voluntary acts."32 and 
"Liberty is the absence of all impediments to action, that are not contained 
in the nature, and in the intrinsecal quality of the Agent."33  
                                                 
30 Hobbes in Questions, 217-18 
 
31 Hobbes in Questions, 40 
 
32 Hobbes in Questions, 38 
 
33 Hobbes in Questions, 285 
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In fact liberty is no more peculiar to rational humans than is voluntariness – 
which can as much be found in animal action as in human.  Indeed liberty 
extends even wider – to streams and rivers, or to anything with force that 
might go in for some action. Given a lack of external obstruction to that 
force, we find liberty: 
 
… how Reason representeth anything to the Will, I understand no 
more than the Bishop understands there may be Liberty in Children, 
in Beasts, and inanimate Creatures.  For he seemeth to wonder how 
Children may be left at liberty; how Beasts imprisoned may be set at 
Liberty; and how a River may have a free course.34  
 
In his arguments about causation, Hobbes regularly assumes that where there 
is power or reason enough for something to happen, then that thing will 
happen.  Thus he argues that all things that begin at some time to exist must 
have a cause:   
 
Also the fixt point, that a man cannot imagine anything to begin 
without a cause, can no other way be made known but by trying how 
he can imagine it.  But if he try, he shall find as much reason (if there 
be no cause of the thing) to conceive, it should begin at one time as 
another, that is, he hath equall reason to think, it should begin at all 
times, which is impossible.  And therefore he must think there was 
some special cause, why it began then rather than sooner or later, or 
else, that it began never, but was Eternal.35   
 
For Hobbes efficient causes are only Suarezian necessary causes, 
determining and necessitating but one outcome. In clear contradiction of 
Suarez, Hobbes denies that the existence of free causal power is ever 
represented in experience. Experience can reveal no such contingent and 
multi-way form of causal power operating independently of prior necessity. 
The belief that our actions are not necessitated but free reflects merely our 
ignorance of their causes – though caused they must be.  In fact this is all 
that the term ‘contingent’ really means – not uncaused and undetermined, 
but cause unknown. Hobbes allows that we are sometimes aware of being 
determined by motivations, and then recognise necessity. But when we are 
not aware of the determination, we mistake this for freedom and genuine 
lack of determination: 
 
But commonly when we see and know the strength that moves us, we 
acknowledge Necessity, but when we see not, or mark not the force 
                                                                                                                             
 
34 Hobbes in Questions, 36 
 
35 Hobbes in Questions, 302 
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that moves us, we then think there is none, and that it is not Causes 
but Liberty that produceth the action.36   
 
And indeed it might be unclear how experience could ever do more than fail 
to represent determination. What would it be, not to fail to represent a cause, 
but to represent the lack of a cause? 
 
Against the scholastic postulation of a free cause sufficient for a range of 
alternative effects, Hobbes puts forward the following a priori argument.  
All causes must be sufficient to produce their effect. But if they are 
sufficient the effect must follow.  So the idea of a free cause is incoherent: if 
the free cause is enough for each effect, it must produce each, which is 
impossible: 
 
But the Bishop defineth Contingents thus, ‘All things which may be 
done and may not be done, may happen, or may not happen by reason 
of the Indetermination, or accidental concurrence of the causes’ by 
which definition Contingent is nothing, or it is the same that I say it 
is.  For, there is nothing can be done and not be done, nothing can 
happen and not happen by reason of the Indetermination or accidental 
concurrence of the causes.  It may be done or not done for aught he 
knowes, and happen or not happen for any determination he 
perceaveth; and that is my definition.  But that the indetermination 
can make it happen or not happen is absurd; for indetermination 
maketh it equally to happen or not to happen; and therefore both; 
which is a contradiction.  Therefore indetermination doth nothing, and 
whatsoever causes do, is necessary.37  
 
 
 - purposiveness and explanation 
 
Hobbes, we have seen, reduces action in general to what had previously been 
the special and secondary case of willed or imperated action - what Hobbes 
was now to term ‘voluntary action’. Hobbes completely abandoned any 
theory of purposiveness as consisting in a distinctively practical mode of 
exercising reason located in the will as a special intellectual or rational 
appetite.  
 
Instead, Hobbes introduced a new model of purposiveness that could only 
apply to the case of what had previously been called imperated action. To act 
purposively was always to do something voluntarily, on the basis of a prior 
will to do it—a will that, in line with much medieval action theory, Hobbes 
conceived to be an efficient cause of the imperated or voluntary action that it 
motivated. But now this motivating will was no longer itself a prior case of 
action, but rather a passion. 
 
                                                 
36 Hobbes in Questions, 217 
 
37 Hobbes in Questions, 184 
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A central issue in the debate is the explanation of action. Action, it is natural 
to think, is explained in terms of its motivation – which is given by the goal 
at which it is directed. Hobbes insists that this goal-direction is given 
through an efficient cause – a prior passion. And in this he is partly adopting 
the standard scholastic picture of the relation between an imperated action 
and its elicited cause – only turning that cause into a passion. But he is also 
rejecting the idea that explanation of an action involves some mode of 
causation, such as formal causation, other than efficient causation; and some 
form of determination that does not involve an antecedent necessity being 
imposed on action. 
 
Both Bramhall and Hobbes assume that action is determined. No appeal is 
made by Bramhall to efficient causation in non-determining mode. Where 
the difference lies is in the manner of determination – whether natural or, as 
Bramhall terms it, moral. The object of the will, for Bramhall, is not an 
efficient or necessitating cause of its operation - what Bramhall means when 
he talks simply of a cause - but rather a moral determinant of it:  
 
Secondly, for the manner how the understanding doth determine the 
Will, it is not naturally but morally. The Will is mooved by the 
understanding, not as by an Efficient, having a causal influence into 
the effect, but only by proposing and representing the object. And 
therefore as it were ridiculous to say, that the object of the sight is the 
cause of seeing, so it is to say, that the proposing of the object by the 
understanding to the will, is the cause of willing; and therefore the 
understanding hath no place in that concourse of causes which 
according to T.H. do necessitate the will.38  
 
Bramhall's moral determination, then, is explanation in terms of an object - 
formal causation as the school tradition termed it. This form of action 
explanation is available provided we admit the existence of content-bearing 
actions of the will. Because an action of the will has content or object-
direction in its own right, the action can be explained, or made intelligible, 
by that very content, and independently of prior efficient causes. For the 
action's object- or goal-direction is internal to the action itself, arising as 
'form' to the action's 'matter'. 
 
For Hobbes, the object or content of the motivating will to act still provided 
the goal at which the action willed was directed. But since the motivating 
will was not itself a purposive action, but merely a passion or passive desire, 
purposiveness - being deliberately or intentionally done as a means to an end 
- was restricted to the action willed. It followed that all explanation in terms 
of purposes now involved reference to a motivating efficient cause. So 
Hobbes could afford to claim that all explanation of action in terms of the 
purposes for which it was performed had to be in terms of efficient causes. 
In fact, Hobbes claimed to find the idea of motivation by objects as opposed 
                                                 
38 Bramhall in Questions, 55-56 
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 - liberty, obligation and blame 
 
Scholastic moral theory had restricted to action the application within ethics 
of 'legal' responses and standards such as blame and obligation; and had 
based this restriction on a conception of action as the locus of a power of 
multi-way self-determination.  Hobbes would either remove the restriction to 
agency, or reconstruct the restriction in some other way, such as by appeal to 
action as a locus of voluntariness. 
 
In scholastic moral theory, whatever disagreements there might have been 
about the relation of law to divine command, there was generally an 
essential connexion made between something being a wrong or a breach of 
law and the possibility of blaming the agent – of imputing the badness of the 
crime to him as his self-determined doing. And that imputation would only 
be possible in relation to action and its outcomes - in so far as it is these that 
are up to us or within our control. "If I was [determined], then I ought not to 
be blamed, for no man is justly blamed for doing that which was never in his 
power to shun."40  And "The essence of sin consists in this, that one commit 
that which he might avoid."41  
 
But Hobbes rejects the scholastic link of blame to freedom. Blame is no 
more than a form of disapproval. Why do we blame anyone for anything? "I 
answer because they please us not.  I might ask him, whether blaming be any 
thing else but saying the thing blamed is ill or imperfect."42  
 
So blame in no way presupposes any power, such as freedom, on the part of 
the person blamed: 
 
I answer, they are to be blamed though their Wills be not in their 
power.  Is not good good and evill evill though they be not in our 
power?  And shall I not call them so?  And is that not Praise and 
Blame?  But it seems that the Bishop takes blame not for the dispraise 
of a thing, but for a praetext and colour of malice and revenge against 
him that he blameth...Here again he [Bramhall] is upon his arguments 
from Blame, which I have answered before; and we do as much blame 
them [inanimate things] as we do men; for we say fire hath done hurt, 
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and the poyson hath killed a man, as well as we say the man done 
unjustly; but we do not seek to be revenged of the fire and of poyson, 
because we cannot make them ask for forgiveness, as we would make 
men do when they have hurt us; so that the blaming of the one and the 
other, that is, the declaring of the hurt or evill action done by them, is 
the same in both; but the malice of man is onely against man43  
 
The sinfulness of an action, and its character as a breach of law, does not 
presuppose freedom as a multi-way power, but simply the action's 
voluntariness, as a mode of doing what we will: "The nature of sin consisteth in 
this, that the action done proceed from our will and be against the Law. A Judge in 
judging whether it be sin or not, which is done against the Law, looks at no 
higher cause of the action than the will of the doer."44  
 
Just as there was no metaphysical power of freedom, there was no room for 
a normativity of law of the kind that natural law was understood to constitute 
by Suarez. There was no room for law as Suarez conceived it - as a special 
directive force of reason that gave normative recognition to the power of 
freedom both by imposing obligations to direct its exercise (lex or ius) and 
by affording rights to protect its exercise (ius). There was no longer a kind of 
normativity that involved both the right and the obligation as twin ways of 
giving normative recognition to freedom as a power:  
 
For though they that speak of this subject, use to confound Ius, and 
Lex, Right and Law; yet they ought to be distinguished; because 
RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbeare; Whereas LAW, 
determineth, and bindeth to one of them; so that Law, and Right, 
differ as much, as Obligation, and Liberty; which in one and the same 
matter are inconsistent. 45 
 
The idea of a right to liberty and that of an obligation are for Hobbes just 
what they might immediately appear to be - simply opposed notions, one 
marking the provision of alternatives at the level of the normative, the other 
the denial of them. And if we take law as a source of obligation - which 
Hobbes proposes to do - then law must be inherently opposed to liberty, and 
the imposition of law must by its very nature serve to remove liberty:  
 
And Law was brought into the world for nothing else, but to limit the 
naturall liberty of particular men, in such manner, as they might not 
hurt, but assist one another, and joyn together against a common 
Enemy.46  
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46 Leviathan 26, 138-9 
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In involving obligations law was not harmonious with freedom, but its 
essential opposite.  
 
We find Hobbes shifting between a variety of ways of speaking of 
obligation.  Sometimes he gives an account of obligation under natural law 
that preserves an important element of the force model - the scope of 
obligation under natural law as binding on non-voluntary motivation.  It is 
just that motivation is no longer understood as an inner locus of 
metaphysical freedom, and obligation is no longer understood as a 
justificatory force linked to blame as a criticism specific to freedom: 
 
The Lawes of Nature oblige in foro interno; that is to say, they bind to 
a desire they should take place: but in foro externo; that is, to the 
putting them in act, not alwayes.47  
 
But elsewhere, where civil or human law's relation to the application of 
sanctions is being emphasised, obligation is treated as a standard on the 
voluntary, so that non-voluntary thoughts are not subject to obligation. This 
approach is used to preserve inner religious belief from being bound by 
coercively enforced human law: 
 
As for the inward thought, and beleef of men, which humane 
Governours can take no notice of, (for God onely knoweth the heart) 
they are not voluntary, nor the effect of the laws, but of the unrevealed 
will, and of the power of God; and consequently fall not under 
obligation.48   
 
Hobbes appeals to two features of religious belief that supposedly block its 
legal coercion. First we have its privacy. The human legislator cannot 
reliably determine what someone's real religious belief might be, so law on 
inner belief is unenforceable on that account. Then secondly, belief is non-
voluntary. Like motivations of the will itself, beliefs cannot be adopted or 
abandoned at will, just in order to avoid sanctions imposed on illegal belief. 
 
This Hobbesean view involved a quite different account of the legal 
regulation of belief from Suarez. For Suarez religious belief is not 
completely private. Religion is a public and social phenomenon; and 
religious belief, especially, is very liable sooner or later to be expressed. But 
more crucially, the relative non-voluntariness of belief is not to the point. 
For the function of sanction-backed legal coercion is not to motivate people 
to form or hold beliefs voluntarily, simply on the basis of a will or 
motivation to avoid sanctions. Rather the function of threatened sanctions is 
forcibly to direct the believer's attention to a sound epistemic case, based on 
evidence or else on authoritative testimony, for the obligatory opinion - a 
                                                 
47 Leviathan 15, 79 
 
48 Leviathan 40, 249-50 
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case that the believer had hitherto been wilfully and culpably ignoring - so 
that the required belief is then formed in response to that epistemic case: 
 
Even a pagan—that is, a non-Christian—king, if he has a knowledge of 
the true God, may coerce his own subjects into believing that truth, 
either by their own reasoning if they are educated, or by putting human 
faith in more learned men, if they are ignorant; and consequently, he 
may compel those same subjects to cease from the worship of idols and 
from similar superstitions contrary to natural reason.49   
 
The punitive imposition of sanctions does not presuppose that belief can be 
formed at will, irrespective of testimony or evidence. Belief is significantly 
non-voluntary precisely because it is dependent on testimony or evidence in 
its support. But, for Suarez, the subject still has some degree of freedom or 
control over whether or not he responds to that evidence. That freedom 
enables him fairly to be bound by obligations on belief, and fairly threatened 
with punishments for breach of those obligations. 
 
At the same time as helping base religious coercion, we must remember that 
for Suarez metaphysical freedom also put normative obstacles to such 
coercion. In particular, as we have seen, the metaphysical freedom of the 
unbaptized protected them against the coercive authority of the Church or of 
the Christian state acting on the Church's behalf. Jews and Moslems could 
not fairly be coerced into believing Christianity, not because the act of faith 
is non-voluntary - this does nothing to protect the culpable baptized heretic 
from canonical penalties on heretical belief - but because the metaphysical 
freedom of the believer demanded a special justification, which only baptism 
can provide, for their coercion. 
 
Hobbes's denial of the very existence of metaphysical freedom forced him to 
limit the authority of the state over religious belief in quite another way - by 
appeal to novel, and arguably rather crudely conceived practical limits on the 
use of punishment in motivating belief. But it is not obvious that these 
practical limits really apply. Legal coercion does arguably serve to influence 
belief in exactly the way that Suarez envisaged, by engaging and directing 
the attention of the believer. The function of penal coercion in the criminal 
law is often to use the threat of a penalty to engage attention and help 
communicate a message that there are anyway prior grounds to believe - that 
the action threatened by punishment really would be seriously wrong. The 
function of sanction-backed criminal law is in part to drive home an 
argument and change what people - not non-rational animals but beings 
equipped with reason - actually believe. 50 
                                                 
49 De fide in Suarez 1856-70, volume 12, 451 
 
50 For an influential defence of a communicative or expressive theory of the 
function of punishment in recent philosophy see Feinberg (1970). The modern, 
post-Hobbesean idea that liberal punishment cannot seek to change people's 
thoughts and beliefs - to direct and form their conscience as well as their external 
actions - is, I would submit, naive both about liberalism and about punishment. 
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Whatever one thinks of the scholastic commitment to a metaphysics of 
multi-way freedom, that metaphysics at least permitted a substantial 
conception of a right to liberty - a right that could extend to religious belief. 
To block the coercion of belief the schoolmen were not forced to distort the 
nature of religious belief itself, such as by denying its deeply social and 
public nature, or the real influence of sanctions as a directive pressure on 
what people believe. 
 
 










Aquinas, Thomas. 1950. Summa theologiae. Turin: Marietti 
 
Calvin, John. 1960. Institutes of the Christian Religion, edited by John T. 
McNeill (2 volumes). Philadelphia: The Westminster Press 
 
Feinberg, Joel. 1970. Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of 
Responsibility.  Princeton: Princeton University Press 
 
Friedberg, Emil. 1881. Corpus iuris canonici (2 volumes). Leipzig: 
Tauchnitz 
 
Hobbes, Thomas. 1983.  De Cive, edited by Howard Warrender. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 
 
Hobbes, Thomas and Bramhall, John. 1656. The Questions Concerning 
Liberty, Necessity and Chance, clearly stated between Dr Bramhall Bishop 
of Derry, and Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, London. 
 
Hobbes, Thomas. 2012. Leviathan, edited by Noel Malcolm. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 
 
Lombard, Peter. 1981.  Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae (2 volumes).  
Grottaferrata: Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas 
 
Pink, Thomas. 2004. "Suarez, Hobbes and the scholastic tradition in action 
theory" in The Will and Human Action: from Antiquity to the Present Day, 
edited by Thomas Pink and Martin Stone, 127-53. London: Routledge. 
 
Pink, Thomas. 2005.  "Action, will and law in late scholasticism," in Moral 
Philosophy on the Threshold of Modernity, (The New Synthese Historical 
Library 57), edited by Jill Kraye and Risto Saarinen, 31-50. Dordrecht: 
Springer. 
 
Pink, Thomas. 2009. "Natural law and the theory of obligation," in 
Psychology and Philosophy, (Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind 
8), edited by Sara Heinämaa and Martina Reuter, 97-114. Dordrecht: 
Springer. 
 
Suarez, Francisco. 1856-70.  Opera Omnia (26 volumes). Paris: Vives 
 
Wolter, Allan. 1986. Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality. Washington: 
CUA Press.  
 
